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DIVINE FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION
Jada Twedt Strabbing
I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, 
the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of 
this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us 
to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable 
of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgive-
ness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and 
Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that this view is particularly well-
suited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without  
our repentance.
The parable of the prodigal son provides a powerful illustration of forgive-
ness (Luke 15:11–32). The son asks for his share of the inheritance and, after 
receiving it, leaves home and squanders it on wild living. When he has 
nothing left, he hires himself out to take care of pigs, and he longs to eat the 
pods that the pigs are eating. Eventually, he comes to his senses, realizing 
that his father’s servants have food to spare. He journeys home to repent 
and to ask his father to treat him like one of the servants. While he is still 
a long way off, his father sees him and has compassion on him. The father 
runs to his son, embraces him, and, when the son expresses repentance, 
does not even give him the chance to ask to be like the hired help. Instead, 
the father directs his servants to bring out the best robe, a ring, and sandals 
for his son and to prepare a great feast to celebrate his return.
The forgiveness bestowed by the father in the parable of the prodigal 
son, meant by Jesus to represent divine forgiveness, beautifully exempli-
fies and supports the account of divine forgiveness that I develop and 
defend in this paper. On this account, divine forgiveness is openness to 
reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing. In the 
parable, the father is clearly open to reconciliation with his son: he runs 
to his son and embraces him; he throws a party for his son and puts the 
best clothes on him. Through these actions, he demonstrates to the repen-
tant prodigal son and to those around them that they are reconciled, that 
the son’s status as a beloved son is intact. On the view that I defend, the 
father’s openness to reconciliation with his son constitutes his forgiving 
his son. As the father’s forgiveness is a picture of divine forgiveness, I 
claim that God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, con-
stitutes His forgiving us.
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My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I set out desiderata that 
a view of divine forgiveness should plausibly meet. In Section II, I discuss 
human forgiveness, using an example to make plausible that human for-
giveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to 
the wrongdoing and clarifying what it means to be open to reconciliation 
with a wrongdoer. I turn to divine forgiveness in Section III. Here I argue 
that, similarly to human forgiveness, divine forgiveness is God’s openness 
to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrong-
doing. I first examine the parable of the prodigal son in order to clarify 
and support this view of divine forgiveness. I then make the case that this 
view meets the desiderata that a view of divine forgiveness should meet, 
including accounting for the close connection between divine forgiveness 
and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I show how this view, when considered 
in conjunction with Christ’s atonement, is well-suited to the idea that God 
forgives us one-sidedly—i.e., without our repentance—although it is also 
consistent with the idea that God does not forgive us one-sidedly. Note 
that I will work within the Christian context, but I think that many of the 
arguments below could be modified for other theistic traditions.
I. Desiderata for a View of Divine Forgiveness
In this section, I set out desiderata that a view of divine forgiveness should 
plausibly meet. These desiderata are not individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for a view of divine forgiveness but are in-
stead intuitive features of divine forgiveness. Hence, for a view of divine 
forgiveness to be plausible, it should meet a significant number of these 
desiderata and, if it does not meet one, provide a reasonable explanation 
for why it does not. These desiderata therefore provide resources for as-
sessing views of divine forgiveness. All but the last of the desiderata apply 
to any account of forgiveness, whether divine or human forgiveness, and 
the last applies only to divine forgiveness in the Christian context.
Start with the desiderata that apply to both divine and human forgive-
ness. First, a view of divine forgiveness should distinguish forgiving an 
offender from excusing him. An excuse shows that an agent is not respon-
sible for some harm done, but when God forgives us for wrongdoing, He 
continues to view us as responsible for it.
Second, a view of divine forgiveness should distinguish forgiveness 
from other ways of no longer blaming an agent while still holding that the 
agent is responsible for the harm, such as ignoring the offense or simply 
moving on from it. If God just ceased to bring to mind our wrongdoing or 
acted like it did not happen, He would not blame us, but He also would 
not have forgiven us.
This idea connects to a commonly held point about human forgiveness: 
that forgiveness is incompatible, or at least at odds, with resenting an of-
fender. In fact, the most prominent account of human forgiveness is that 
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forgiveness is relinquishing resentment toward the wrongdoer.1 Resent-
ment, as P. F. Strawson points out, is a negative emotional response to the 
ill will or indifference expressed in someone’s action toward oneself, and 
it is a form of blame.2 As such, resentment seems at odds with forgiveness. 
Yet forgiveness is not the only way to relinquish resentment. We can also 
relinquish it by putting the offense out of our mind or moving on from 
it. A view of forgiveness must say what sets forgiveness apart from these 
other ways of relinquishing resentment. More generally, then, whether or 
not God can have emotions like resentment, a view of divine forgiveness 
must say how divine forgiveness differs from other ways in which God 
could cease to blame us for our wrongdoing.
Third, a view of divine forgiveness should allow the conceptual pos-
sibility of God’s forgiving us without our repenting—what I call one-sided 
forgiveness. This desideratum does not imply that God actually forgives us 
without our repenting, as God may have good reason not to do so or some 
aspect of His divine nature may be inconsistent with His doing so.3 A view 
of divine forgiveness itself, however, should not rule out the possibility of 
divine one-sided forgiveness.
To see why, first notice that humans can bestow one-sided forgiveness. 
Louis Zamperini provides a powerful real-life case.4 Taken captive by the 
Japanese during World War II, Zamperini was mercilessly tortured and 
kept in a state of near starvation as he moved amongst Japanese prisoner-
of-war camps. Matsuhiro “The Bird” Watanabe, a sadistic prison guard, 
especially brutalized him. When the Japanese surrendered, Zamperini 
regained his freedom and returned home a war hero. Yet he continued to 
be haunted by nightmares that began while he was a prisoner of war, and 
to cope with the nightmares and with despair, he drank heavily. His life 
turned around in 1949, when he converted to Christianity. At the moment 
of his conversion, Zamperini forgave his prison guards. In an interview 
many years later, he said:
[Upon converting to Christianity,] I got off my knees and somehow I knew 
I was through getting drunk. I knew it. I also knew that I forgave all my 
guards including “The Bird.” I think proof of that is I had nightmares every 
night about “The Bird” since the war. The night I made my decision for 
Christ, I haven’t had a nightmare since—1949 till now! That is some kind of 
a miracle.5
1See, for example, Butler, Fifteen Sermons; Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment;” 
Murphy, Getting Even; Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 76. 
2Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 75–77.
3In Section III.4, I consider and reject some arguments that God has good reason not to 
forgive us one-sidedly, and in Section III.5, I consider and reject an argument that the divine 
nature is incompatible with forgiveness.
4The following information about Louis Zamperini’s life is from Jacobs, “Lucky Louis 
Zamperini” and from Zamperini, “Unbroken’s Louis Zamperini.” 
5Zamperini, “Unbroken’s Louis Zamperini.”
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Zamperini then traveled to Japan as a missionary in 1950, meeting with 
some of his former prison guards and expressing forgiveness to them. His 
expressions of forgiveness were so powerful that, according to Zamperini, 
some of them even converted to Christianity as a result.
When Zamperini said that he forgave his prison guards without re-
pentance on their side, we should take this at face value. He is not using 
the term “forgiveness” incorrectly; he really did forgive them. We should 
therefore accept that humans can forgive one-sidedly.6 Further, there seems 
to be nothing about the nature of forgiveness itself that would preclude di-
vine one-sided forgiveness while allowing human one-sided forgiveness. 
Thus, if God does not or cannot forgive one-sidedly, this result should not 
be settled by a view of what divine forgiveness is but rather by an argu-
ment that God, for whatever reason, does not or cannot forgive us without 
our repentance. Notice that the same can be said for whether God forgives 
at all: if God does not or cannot forgive, a view of what divine forgiveness 
is (or would be) should not settle this issue.
Fourth, a view of divine forgiveness should not only allow the pos-
sibility of one-sided forgiveness but should also allow it to be virtuous. 
6Both Charles Griswold and Richard Swinburne argue against the possibility of one-sided 
forgiveness, but I think that their arguments are problematic. Griswold argues that one-
sided forgiveness is not forgiveness because it compromises the moral point of forgiveness. 
Specifically, he says that the offer of forgiveness without the offender’s repentance “would 
likely be interpreted by the offender (and possibly third parties as well) as condonation or 
excuse making—either amounting to collusion with wrong-doing. Obviously this would 
compromise the moral point of the act.” (Griswold, Forgiveness, 121.) We should not accept 
Griswold’s argument. To start, the idea that the offer of one-sided forgiveness would likely 
be interpreted as condonation or excuse-making does not entail that it is. This argument is 
at best an argument against expressing one-sided forgiveness to those who might misinter-
pret it. Further, if one-sided forgiveness did entail condonation or excusing-making, which 
I doubt, the correct conclusion to draw would be that we morally should not forgive one-
sidedly, rather than that we cannot forgive one-sidedly. Of course, if one-sided forgiveness 
merely amounted to condonation or excuse-making, then perhaps we should reject its pos-
sibility. But again, Griswold has given us no reason to think that this is so, and as cases like 
that of Louis Zamperini illustrate, we intuitively take one-sided forgiveness to be distinct 
from condonation and excuse-making.
 As for Swinburne, he states that we should reject the possibility of one-sided forgiveness 
on the grounds that forgiveness is normally considered to be a good thing but one-sided 
forgiveness is not a good thing, since it treats the offense as not having been done (Swin-
burne, Responsibility and Atonement, 85–87). If Swinburne is correct that one-sided forgiveness 
is not a good thing, which I doubt, the correct conclusion again is that we should not forgive 
one-sidedly, not that we cannot. To compare, it may not be a good thing for victims to forgive 
repentant wrongdoers for horrendous evils. (Consider the intense criticism of Eva Kor, an 
Auschwitz survivor, for forgiving repentant former Nazis.) Yet, if that is so, it just shows 
that we should not forgive repentant wrongdoers for horrendous evils, not that we cannot. 
Further, contrary to Swinburne, forgiveness need not treat the offense as not having been 
done, as I make clear in Section II in defending the view that forgiveness is openness to 
reconciliation. Thus Griswold and Swinburne have given us no reason to reject the intuitive 
view that one-sided forgiveness is possible. In fact, given the prevalence of cases in which 
we think that one-sided forgiveness occurs, such as the Zamperini case, we should accept 
not only that one-sided forgiveness is possible but also that it occurs. As another example, 
consider the forgiveness expressed to an unrepentant Dylann Roof by the family members 
of those he murdered at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC, in 
July 2015.
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The one-sided forgiveness that Louis Zamperini bestowed on his former 
prison guards is so powerful and beautiful because it displays incredible 
virtue. A view of divine forgiveness should not foreclose the possibility 
that God displays such virtue in one-sided forgiveness.7 In fact, in the par-
able of the prodigal son, the father seems to bestow one-sided forgiveness. 
After all, even while the son is a long way off, and so even before the father 
knows that his son has repented, the father has compassion on his son, 
runs to him, and embraces him. This one-sided forgiveness is virtuous, 
and as mentioned above, it is meant to be a picture of divine forgiveness.8
Fifth, a view of divine forgiveness should account for the power of 
divine forgiveness to reconcile repentant wrongdoers to God. At least in 
the context of close human relationships, forgiveness is sought to repair 
the relationship, and when forgiveness is then granted, the relationship is 
often restored.9 This connection between forgiveness and reconciliation is 
clearly displayed in the parable of the prodigal son: the father’s forgive-
ness and the son’s repentance restore their relationship to a father and son 
relationship of good standing. Similarly, when we ask God for forgive-
ness, we seek to reestablish a relationship with Him, and His forgiveness 
reconciles us to Him. A view of divine forgiveness should explain why 
God’s forgiveness reconciles repentant offenders to Him.
So far, I have put forward desiderata for a view of divine forgiveness 
that any view of forgiveness must meet. I see one further desideratum for 
7Anthony Bash raises the following difficulties for the view that one-sided forgiveness is 
typically virtuous: (a) such forgiveness may allow the wrongdoer to escape personal account-
ability for the wrong, (b) such forgiveness may undermine the incentive and opportunity of 
the wrongdoer to right the wrong, (c) the wrongdoer may not learn a lesson, (d) such forgive-
ness requires the victim to do more than God, who just forgives the repentant, and (e) such 
forgiveness can leave wrongdoers “bewildered, even amused,” when they do not know or 
care that they acted wrongly (Bash, Forgiveness, 44). Yet consideration (e) is not an argument 
against the virtuousness of one-sided forgiveness but rather an argument against expressing 
one-sided forgiveness to wrongdoers unless they are in a position to receive it properly. 
As for considerations (a)–(c), the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation avoids 
these implications, as I discuss in n. 13 below, since the wrongdoer must repent in order for 
actual reconciliation to take place. Finally, consideration (d) wrongly assumes that one-sided 
forgiveness, if virtuous, is required. Further, there may be reasons why humans but not 
God should forgive one-sidedly. Yet the important point is that a view of divine forgiveness 
should not rule out the possibility that God forgives one-sidedly and is virtuous in doing so. 
8It is possible that the father knows that the prodigal son has repented just from the fact 
that he returns. Anthony Bash seems to take this interpretation (Forgiveness, 99). Even if that 
is so, the father still seems to forgive his son one-sidedly, given how immediately he has 
compassion on his son and runs to him. Yet even if the parable does not illustrate one-sided 
forgiveness, that does not undermine the central argument in this paper, as that argument 
does not depend upon interpreting the parable as one-sided forgiveness.
9Many philosophers and theologians writing on forgiveness acknowledge that forgive-
ness ordinarily or ideally aims at reconciliation or is about restoring relationships. See, for 
example, Bash, Forgiveness, 38; Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, 107; Adams, “For-
giveness: A Christian Model,” 299; Stump, “Love, By All Accounts,” 36–37; Pettigrove, “The 
Dilemma of Divine Forgiveness,” 459. However, none of these authors advocates the view 
that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation. Throughout this paper, especially in 
the footnotes, I highlight how that view differs from these other authors’ views and why we 
should prefer it. 
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a view of divine forgiveness in the Christian context: it should account 
for the connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. 
According to Christian Scripture and tradition, God’s forgiving us is 
somehow bound up with the person of Christ and, specifically, with 
Christ’s atonement. For example, Ephesians 1:7 says about Christ: “In him 
we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, 
according to the riches of his grace” (NRSV). A view of Christian divine 
forgiveness should be compatible with and make sense of how Christ’s 
atonement is connected to divine forgiveness.
II. Human Forgiveness: Forgiveness as Openness to Reconciliation
In this section, I draw on a picture of human forgiveness that I support 
elsewhere: that human forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the 
wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing.10 Specifically, I argue for this 
view:
Openness-to-Reconciliation View: X forgives Y for Y’s wrong action (or 
pattern of wrong actions) W in virtue of X’s being open to reconciliation 
with Y with respect to W.
I cannot here repeat the entire argument for the Openness-to-Reconcili-
ation View of human forgiveness. Instead, I will first use an example to 
clarify the view and make it plausible and will then address a couple of 
objections to it. Doing so will set the stage for my argument in the next 
section that this view of human forgiveness plausibly extends to divine 
forgiveness. (In what follows, for ease of exposition, I typically suppress 
the “with respect to W” clause, except when necessary for clarity. Yet note 
that this clause is important, since we can forgive someone for some but 
not all of the wrongs that she has committed against us, which is espe-
cially clear when we are unaware of some of them.)
Consider an example of human forgiveness in a close relationship. 
Imagine that a close friend has betrayed your confidence, telling your 
gossip-prone colleague about your frustrations with comments made at 
a recent faculty meeting. When you find out, you are angry, and your 
close friend is repentant. She asks for forgiveness. In asking for forgive-
ness, your friend acknowledges that she acted wrongly in betraying your 
confidence and that she is responsible for it. Yet she is doing more than 
that: she is seeking reconciliation with you. Now consider your response. 
First imagine that you remain angry and refuse to forgive. You are not 
yet open to reconciliation with your friend, and your friendship remains 
harmed. Next, imagine instead that you express forgiveness to her. If your 
forgiveness is genuine, you and your friend are reconciled. What makes 
it the case that you forgive your friend, thus reconciling with her? I claim 
that you forgive her for betraying your confidence in virtue of being open 
to reconciliation with her, the wrongdoer, with respect to betraying your 
10Strabbing, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation.”
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confidence. You and your friend are reconciled because you are both open 
to reconciliation—you through forgiveness and she through repentance.11
I should be clear about what I mean by being “open to reconciliation.” 
In one sense, you could respond to your friend like this: “I am open to 
reconciling with you. But first, I want you to make it up to me by letting 
me borrow your car for the weekend.” Or you could say: “I am open to 
reconciling with you. But first I need some space to cool off before we 
can work through this.” The sense of openness to reconciliation in these 
two statements is not what I have in mind. As I understand openness to 
reconciliation, the first statement amounts to: “I will be open to reconciling 
with you, if you let me borrow your car for the weekend.” The second 
amounts to: “I will be open to reconciling with you after I have some time to 
cool off.” After all, these statements do not express forgiveness but rather 
that forgiveness will be forthcoming if or after a certain condition is met. 
Instead, as I understand it, you are open to reconciliation with your friend 
in virtue of having attitudes and intentions toward her that restores your 
friendship to a friendship of good standing, if your friend’s attitudes and 
intentions are what they need to be to restore the friendship to a friendship 
of good standing—i.e., she is appropriately repentant, has the attitudes 
required to be a trusted confidant going forward, etc. We can think of your 
being open to reconciliation with your friend as your playing your part in 
the reconciliation, so that all that remains is for her to do her part.
Importantly, being open to reconciliation with your friend does not 
require you to have exactly the same attitudes and intentions toward 
her as you had before she betrayed your confidence. What matters for 
reconciliation is that you have the attitudes and intentions required for a 
friendship of good standing. Hence, you can be open to reconciliation with 
your repentant friend while, say, finding it more difficult to confide in her 
at first, as long as that does not prevent you from restoring a friendship 
of good standing. On my view of forgiveness, therefore, you can forgive 
someone without having the exact same attitudes and intentions toward 
her after the offense, which is the right result.
Further, notice that you can be open to reconciliation with your friend 
even if she were not repentant, since playing your part in the reconciliation 
does not require her to play her part. This is crucial because it shows that 
the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation allows one-sided 
11Certain epistemic conditions must also be met in order for reconciliation to take place 
with respect to the wrongdoing—e.g., you must know or reasonably believe that your friend 
is repentant for that wrongdoing. I set aside these epistemic conditions, since they are not 
necessary for being open to reconciliation with respect to the wrongdoing and so are not nec-
essary for forgiveness on my account. Although my argument does not hinge upon it, you 
might question the idea that you must know or reasonably believe that your friend is repen-
tant in order for reconciliation to take place. After all, as Cheshire Calhoun vividly illustrates, 
you can forgive an unrepentant wrongdoer and choose to continue a close relationship with 
her ( “Changing One’s Heart”). In such cases, though, you are not reconciled with the wrong-
doer with respect to her wrongdoing. Instead, you forgive her for the wrongdoing and choose 
to continue the relationship in spite of not being reconciled with respect to the wrongdoing. 
I thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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forgiveness. Further, it reveals another way in which you can be open to 
reconciliation with your friend while having different attitudes and inten-
tions toward her after the offense. Notice that the appropriateness of some 
attitudes and intentions within a relationship depends upon the other 
person’s having certain attitudes and intentions. Thus, if your friend were 
unrepentant, you can be open to reconciliation with her without having 
some attitudes and intentions required for a friendship of good standing 
if those attitudes and intentions depend for their appropriateness on at-
titudes and intentions that your friend lacks. But in this case, in order to 
be open to reconciliation with your friend, you must be prepared to have 
those attitudes and intentions if and when your friend has the attitudes 
and intentions that she should have. For example, if your friend is unre-
pentant, you can be open to reconciliation with her without intending to 
confide in her, since she lacks the attitudes and intentions required to be 
a worthy confidant. However, to be open to reconciliation with her, you 
must be prepared to intend to confide in her again once she repents and 
has the attitudes and intentions required to be a worthy confidant.12 Thus 
the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation does not have the 
implausible result that forgiving an unrepentant friend means that you 
must trust her again in spite of her lack of repentance.13
I have just shown that the view that forgiveness is openness to recon-
ciliation meets the desideratum of allowing one-sided forgiveness. I will 
now discuss one other desideratum that a view of forgiveness must meet, 
as it highlights the main advantage of the view presented here over other 
views of forgiveness. I will wait until the next section, where I discuss 
divine forgiveness specifically, to show that this view of forgiveness meets 
the other desiderata.
Recall that a view of forgiveness should account for the power of for-
giveness to effect reconciliation with a repentant offender. The view that 
forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer directly 
accounts for this power, and it directly explains why forgiveness is sought 
and bestowed to bring about reconciliation. In this respect, the Openness-
12In “Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” I claim that we should understand being prepared 
to have certain intentions or attitudes toward the wrongdoer as having conditional inten-
tions or attitudes toward her. For example, you are prepared to intend to confide in your 
friend again once she repents in virtue of having the following conditional intention toward 
her: to confide in your friend if she repents. 
13Hence the Openness-to-Reconciliation View does not have the upshot that Richard 
Swinburne worries about with respect to one-sided forgiveness: namely, that the for-
giver must act like the offense had not been done (Responsibility and Atonement, 85–87; n. 
6 above). The Openness-to-Reconciliation View also avoids Anthony Bash’s worries about 
the virtuousness of one-sided forgiveness, discussed in n. 7 above (Forgiveness, 44). On the 
Openness-to-Reconciliation View, the forgiven unrepentant wrongdoer does not escape per-
sonal responsibility for the wrong, still has incentive to right the wrong, and may reasonably 
still learn a lesson because being open to reconciliation with him, and so forgiving him, 
does not require having attitudes toward him that are appropriate only if he were repentant. 
Hence the wrongdoer still faces relational consequences for his wrongdoing and still has the 
incentive of restoring the relationship. 
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to-Reconciliation View has a substantial advantage over other views of 
forgiveness. Consider again the most prominent account of forgiveness, 
which claims that forgiveness is relinquishing resentment. As I argue 
elsewhere,14 one of the problems with this view is that it fails to account 
adequately for forgiveness’s power to effect reconciliation. This is because 
letting go of a negative emotion, on whatever grounds, does not capture 
the emotional movement toward the offender that is essential for recon-
ciliation. Dana Nelkin’s view that forgiveness is releasing the wrongdoer 
from personal obligations incurred by his wrongdoer falls prey to the 
same concern.15 By focusing just on letting go of personal obligations, it 
cannot explain the emotional movement toward the offender necessary 
for reconciliation.
Of course, relinquishing resentment and releasing the wrongdoer from 
personal obligations incurred by his wrongdoing, although insufficient for 
forgiveness, are important and perhaps necessary features of forgiveness. 
The view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrong-
doer explains why that is so: relinquishing resentment and releasing the 
wrongdoer from personal obligations incurred by his wrongdoing are, at 
least often, necessary for the victim to be open to reconciliation with the 
wrongdoer. This view, then, has the advantage of explaining the features 
of forgiveness that other views take to constitute forgiveness.16
Before turning to divine forgiveness, I should briefly respond to two 
significant concerns that one might have about this view of human for-
giveness.17 First, one might worry that this view implausibly entails that, 
in order to forgive, you must be open to restoring a previously existing 
close relationship with someone who has seriously wronged you.18 For 
14Strabbing, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation.”
15Nelkin, “Freedom and Forgiveness.” 
16The Openness-to-Reconciliation View also accounts for the intuitive pull of Richard 
Swinburne’s idea that forgiveness is accepting a wrongdoer’s atonement. Swinburne says 
that “[y]our acceptance of my reparation, penance and, above all, apology, is forgiving” 
(Responsibility and Atonement, 85). In accepting my atonement, you acknowledge my open-
ness to reconciliation with you and demonstrate your openness to reconciliation with me. 
We are thereby reconciled by your acceptance of my atonement. (My offered atonement also 
commonly plays the role of bringing about your openness to reconciliation with me.) John 
Hare makes a similar point about Swinburne’s view, claiming that in my offering atonement 
and in your accepting it, we each do our part in restoring the relationship. As Hare then says, 
this shows that forgiveness is consistent with accepting reparation (The Moral Gap, 229). Note 
that Swinburne’s idea is not the essence of forgiveness, since it incorrectly does not allow 
one-sided forgiveness, as I discuss in n. 6 and n. 13 above. 
17I consider both of the following objections and respond to them in more depth in 
Strabbing, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation.” I thank an anonymous referee for asking me to 
say more about the first one and to address the second one in this paper.
18Many philosophers who claim that forgiveness ideally or ordinarily restores relation-
ships or aims at reconciliation raise this issue in denying that forgiveness must involve 
openness to reconciliation. Glen Pettigrove sums it up well, saying, “[O]rdinarily forgiveness 
aims at reconciliation. It need not: it is possible to forgive someone at the same time that 
one realizes one cannot go on with them in the old way” (“The Dilemma of Divine Forgive-
ness,” 459). Marilyn McCord Adams (“Forgiveness: A Christian Model,” 299 )and Anthony 
Bash (Forgiveness, 58) also raise this worry. It may be worth mentioning that Anthony Bash 
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example, one might worry that this view implausibly entails that, in order 
to forgive an abusive partner, the abused partner must be open to con-
tinuing on as partners.19 Contrary to this objection, the view presented 
here not only avoids that problematic implication but also better explains 
forgiveness in such cases than other views. This is because, by connecting 
forgiveness to the relational concept of reconciliation, the Openness-to-
Reconciliation View reveals that we can forgive on different relationship 
levels, depending upon which relationship we are open to restoring. For 
example, you may forgive your disloyal friend as a person but not as a 
friend in virtue of being open to restoring a relationship of good will with 
her but not a friendship. Similarly, the abused partner may forgive the 
abuser as a person but not as a partner in virtue of being open to restoring 
a relationship of good will but not being open to continuing on as part-
ners.20
Of course, if the abuser repents and asks for forgiveness and the abused 
partner responds, “I forgive you and wish you well, but I do not want 
to continue our relationship,” the abuser will likely not feel forgiven.21 
However, the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation easily ex-
plains this: in asking for forgiveness, the abuser is asking for forgiveness 
as a partner, and he does not receive forgiveness on that relationship level. 
Thus, by revealing that we can forgive on different relationship levels, the 
view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation explains why we think 
both that the abused partner has forgiven the abuser and that the abuser 
may reasonably think that he has not been forgiven.
also denies a tight connection between forgiveness and reconciliation in the other direction, 
saying that the restoration of a relationship can occur without forgiveness, since two people 
can restore their relationship after wrongdoing without forgiveness taking place (Forgive-
ness, 59). However, such a case does not count against the view presented here, on which 
forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with respect to the wrongdoing. In such cases, the 
relationship is not restored with respect to the wrongdoing even though the parties decide 
to continue the relationship.
19Jeffrie Murphy raises this example in order to resist a tight connection between forgive-
ness and reconciliation (Getting Even, 14–15).
20Eleonore Stump, following Aquinas, claims that forgiveness involves love and so in-
volves two desires: the desire for the good of the wrongdoer and the desire for union with 
him (“Love, By All Accounts,” 36–37). She then adds that, if the wrongdoer has destroyed 
the prior relationship with his wrongdoing, the desire for union with him involved in for-
giveness “can appropriately come to no more than the sort of desire for union involved in 
the generic love of humanity provided for in Aquinas’s account of love” (36). This idea has 
resonances with my idea of being open to reconciliation with someone as a person. However, 
the Openness-to-Reconciliation View differs from what Stump says here in two significant 
ways. (Note that Stump does not take herself to be putting forward a view of what forgive-
ness is.) First, being open to reconciliation with someone involves a constellation of attitudes 
and intentions that, together with the right attitudes on the other’s part, would constitute the 
particular relationship at issue, whereas Stump focuses on just two distinct desires. Second, 
Stump says that, if the wrongdoer has repented and has not destroyed the relationship with 
his wrongdoing, then the victim has not forgiven him if she withdraws from the former re-
lationship. I disagree. On the view that I advocate, in these cases, the victim may still forgive 
him as a person, even if she has not forgiven him as a party to the close relationship and even 
if she should forgive him as a party to the close relationship.
21Glen Pettigrove makes a similar point. (Pettigrove, “Forgiveness without God?,” 522.)
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The idea that we can forgive on different relationship levels also shows 
how the Openness-to-Reconciliation View is superior to another popular 
view: forgiveness as foreswearing hostile attitudes toward the wrongdoer 
plus having some kind of positive regard toward him.22 Different versions 
of this view propose different candidates for positive regard. For example, 
Eve Garrard and David McNaughton suggest good will, Aurel Kolnai 
suggests trust, David Novitz suggests compassion, and Jean Hampton 
suggests reapproval.23 This view improves upon the view that forgiveness 
is foreswearing resentment, since it rightly brings into forgiveness some 
emotional movement toward the offender. The problem with this view, 
however, is that it only accounts for forgiveness’s power to reconcile some 
relationships but not others. Consider Garrard and McNaughton’s view 
that forgiveness is foreswearing hostile attitudes towards the wrongdoer 
plus having some degree of good will toward him. This view may ad-
equately describe how forgiveness effects reconciliation with a repentant 
wrongdoer who is a mere acquaintance, but it is too weak to explain how 
forgiveness effects reconciliation with a repentant wrongdoer in a close 
relationship, since more than good will is required to restore close relation-
ships. This point generalizes. However, we understand positive regard, it 
can account for the power of forgiveness to reconcile some relationships 
but not others, since different kinds of relationships have varying degrees 
of intimacy and require different positive attitudes to restore them. The 
view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation avoids this problem. 
It also explains which positive attitudes are needed in specific cases of 
forgiveness: namely, those required for restoration of the particular rela-
tionship at issue.
The idea that we can forgive on different relationship levels is crucial 
for assessing the Openness-to-Reconciliation View as a view of human 
forgiveness. Yet this important nuance likely does not come into play with 
respect to divine forgiveness. This is because we can assume, based on 
Scripture such as the parable of the prodigal son, that God is open to re-
storing an intimate relationship with all of us, and so on the view that I 
advocate, He forgives us on that intimate relationship level.24 (I will have 
a bit more to say about this relationship in the next section.)
I will discuss the second objection more briefly. One might worry that 
the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation cannot account for 
the fact that we can forgive the dead. That is not so. On this view, to forgive 
22This formulation of the general view follows Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love, 8–9.
23Garrard and McNaughton, “In Defense of Unconditional Forgiveness;” Garrard and 
McNaughton, Forgiveness; Kolnai, “Forgiveness;” Novitz, “Forgiveness and Self-Respect;” 
Hampton, “The Retributive Idea.” 
24Interestingly, in the parable of the prodigal son, the son repents and asks to be like 
one of the servants, thus seeking to reconcile with his father on a lower relationship level, 
because he takes himself not to be worthy of being his father’s son anymore (Luke 15:18–19). 
In restoring the father/son relationship, the father then forgives him on a deeper relationship 
level than he expects. Hence we can see how forgiveness functions on different relationship 
levels even in this parable.
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a wrongdoer who is now dead is to be open to reconciliation with him, 
which means having attitudes and intentions toward him such that, if he 
were alive and repentant, you would be reconciled to each other. You can 
have such attitudes and intentions toward a dead person because having 
them does not depend upon the other person’s attitudes and intentions or 
even upon whether he is still capable of having attitudes and intentions. 
Of course, if there is no afterlife, reconciliation could only be hypothetical, 
but that is not a problem, since being open to reconciliation with a wrong-
doer does not require aiming at reconciliation but simply requires having 
those attitudes and intentions toward him that constitute being open to 
reconciliation.
III. Divine Forgiveness
So far, I have set out desiderata that a view of divine forgiveness should 
plausibly meet, and I have made a brief case for the view that human 
forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect 
to the wrongdoing. In this section, I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s 
openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our 
wrongdoing. In other words, I argue for this view:
Openness-to-Reconciliation View of divine forgiveness: God forgives a 
wrongdoer Y for a wrong action (or pattern of wrong actions) W in 
virtue of being open to reconciliation with Y with respect to W.
For ease of exposition, and because we can assume that God would forgive 
us for all of our transgressions when He forgives us, I typically suppress 
the “with respect to W” clause in the discussion below, but it is worth 
noting that God forgives us with respect to specific transgressions.
III.1 The Parable of the Prodigal Son
Return to the parable of the prodigal son. As mentioned above, I take this 
parable to illustrate divine forgiveness.25 The repentant prodigal son returns 
25Martha Nussbaum objects to this common understanding of the parable of the Prodigal 
Son, claiming that the parable illustrates God’s unconditional love rather than His forgive-
ness. This is because, Nussbaum says, the parable does not explicitly refer to forgiveness, 
and the father does not go through a process of thinking about his resentment and choosing 
to give it up (Anger and Forgiveness, 81). We should not accept Nussbaum’s interpretation. 
To start, the parable can illustrate forgiveness without referring explicitly to it, especially 
since the parable explicitly refers to the son’s intention to express repentance to his father 
and to his expressing it. Further, the father’s actions in response to his son’s expression of 
repentance are naturally interpreted as expressing forgiveness. After all, the son would have 
every reason to believe that he had been forgiven based on his father’s actions. More impor-
tantly, Nussbaum should not draw such a sharp contrast between unconditional love and 
forgiveness. The father’s unconditional love for his son plausibly explains his lavish forgive-
ness. Nussbaum’s fundamental concern seems to be that the father does not go through a 
process of thinking about and choosing to give up resentment, but even if we accept that 
foreswearing resentment is necessary for forgiveness, we should not accept that such a pro-
cess is necessary. The father, due to his unconditional love for his son, could just find that 
his resentment has vanished when he sees his son. Alternatively, the father could have gone 
through the process of foreswearing resentment toward his son before his son’s return. As 
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home, hoping just to be a servant in his father’s household. Instead, the fa-
ther forgives him, and they are reconciled, the son’s status as beloved son 
restored. Notice that the father’s expressions of forgiveness—running to 
his son, embracing him, and then joyfully celebrating his return—are ex-
pressions of his openness to reconciliation with his son. This is so, I claim, 
because the father forgives his son in virtue of being open to reconciliation 
with him. Because this parable is a picture of divine forgiveness, it supports 
the idea that God’s forgiveness just is His openness to reconciliation with 
us, the wrongdoers.
Recall that, by the father’s being open to reconciliation with his son, I 
mean that the father plays his part in the reconciliation, so that all that 
remains for reconciliation is for the son to play his part. In other words, the 
father is open to reconciliation with his son in virtue of having attitudes 
and intentions toward his son that would reconcile them, if the son repents 
and has the attitudes and intentions toward his father that he should have. 
Again, this does not require the father to have exactly the same attitudes 
and intentions toward the prodigal son as he had before the son left. He 
need not act like the offense never happened. Instead, what matters for 
reconciliation is that the father has the attitudes and intentions required for 
a father-son relationship of good standing. Thus, he can be open to recon-
ciliation with the prodigal son while intending to give everything that he 
has left to the older son, who remained by his side. Further, as discussed 
above, if the prodigal son were unrepentant, the father can be open to 
reconciliation while only being prepared to have those attitudes and inten-
tions required for a good father-son relationship whose appropriateness 
hinge on the son’s repentance.
Similarly, by God’s being open to reconciliation with us, I mean that He 
does His part in reconciling with us—i.e., He has those attitudes and inten-
tions toward us that would reconcile us to Him, if we repent and have the 
attitudes and intentions that we should have. God’s attitudes and intentions 
toward us need not be the same as they would have been if we had never 
sinned. All that matters for reconciliation with God is that our relation-
ship with Him can be restored, and hence He can be open to reconciliation 
with us while, say, desiring that we had never behaved in certain ways, 
since presumably such a desire would not stand in the way of a restored 
relationship with Him. Further, if we do not repent, God can be open to 
reconciliation with us while just being prepared to have those attitudes and 
intentions required for a good relationship whose appropriateness hinge 
upon our repentance.
In saying this, I assume that God has attitudes and intentions toward 
us. If I am wrong about this, I do not take it to be a strike against the 
Openness-to-Reconciliation View of divine forgiveness in particular. If 
God does not have attitudes and intentions toward us, it is difficult to see 
Anthony Bash points out, the father has time during his son’s absence to prepare to offer him 
forgiveness (Forgiveness, 33).
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how He could have a relationship with us at all, let alone be able to forgive 
us, as forgiveness takes place in the context of a relationship. I am not as-
suming that God’s attitudes and intentions toward us can change. It could 
be that God is outside of time, and his attitudes and intentions toward us 
are timelessly such that He is open to reconciliation with us with respect 
to the wrongs that we commit. He timelessly plays His part in the recon-
ciliation. Or, for a particular person Y, it could be that He is unchangeably 
not open to reconciliation with Y-before-repentance and unchangeably 
open to reconciliation with Y-after-repentance, two time slices of Y.
You may wonder: what exactly is this relationship that God is open to 
restoring in forgiving us? This is a difficult theological question. Scrip-
ture compares a right relationship with God sometimes to a parent-child 
relationship, sometimes to a marriage relationship, and sometimes to 
a friendship. I assume, then, that a right relationship with God has ele-
ments of—or at least analogues to—each of these kinds of intimate human 
relationships, but I will not attempt to flesh this out. Instead, I just take 
for granted that we can have an intimate relationship with God and that 
this intimate relationship is the one that He is open to restoring when 
He forgives us. (Yet even if I am wrong about this, note that forgiveness 
takes place in the context of a relationship, and so you can substitute in 
whatever kind of relationship you take to hold between God and us when 
we repent and He forgives us.)
I have claimed that the parable of the prodigal son supports the view 
that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us. You 
might raise the following worry about that claim: although the father 
expresses forgiveness, he goes beyond that in expressing openness to rec-
onciliation to his son. In other words, you might worry that the father’s 
forgiving his son is necessary but insufficient for being open to reconcili-
ation with him. If that were so, then we should not analyze forgiveness in 
terms of openness to reconciliation.
The father’s expressions of being open to reconciliation with his son are 
certainly lavish, and forgiveness does not require such a lavish response. 
But being open to reconciliation does not require such a lavish response 
either. The father could have expressed openness to reconciliation with his 
son in a more restrained way, such as simply embracing his son and wel-
coming him back. Hence the fact that the father does more than is required 
for forgiveness is not a strike against the view under consideration because 
he also does more than is required for openness to reconciliation. Hence 
the parable of the prodigal son not only illustrates divine forgiveness but 
also illustrates how extravagantly God expresses that forgiveness. Further, 
remember that forgiveness has the power to effect reconciliation with a 
repentant offender. This would not be so if forgiveness were insufficient 
for being open to reconciliation with the offender.
In sum, by making vivid the deep connection between God’s forgive-
ness and His openness to reconciliation with us, the parable of the prodigal 
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son supports the view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation 
with us, the wrongdoers.
III.2. Meeting the Desiderata
In this section, I argue that the view of divine forgiveness as openness to 
reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, meets the desiderata set out in 
Section I. To start, if divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation 
with us, then our repenting and His forgiving us straightforwardly results 
in reconciliation between us and Him.26 Thus this view explains the power 
of divine forgiveness to reconcile repentant wrongdoers to God, and it 
explains why, in seeking forgiveness from God, we seek reconciliation 
with Him.27
This is a major advantage of the view. If we took divine forgiveness 
to be analogous to other views of human forgiveness, the resulting view 
could not adequately account for how divine forgiveness brings about rec-
onciliation between God and a repentant offender. This is because, as we 
have seen, letting go of a negative attitude or releasing an offender from 
obligations or punishment does not account for the emotional and attitu-
dinal movement toward the offender essential for reconciliation. Further, 
as I claimed above, even replacing resentment with a positive attitude like 
good will is not enough to restore an intimate relationship. This is clearly 
illustrated in the parable of the prodigal son. The father does not just let 
go of negative emotions or adopt some positive attitude such as good will 
toward the prodigal son; he embraces his son and welcomes him back.
Next, the view of divine forgiveness as openness to reconciliation distin-
guishes forgiveness from excuse. God’s being open to reconciliation with 
us presumes that we acted wrongly and are responsible for it. After all, if 
we had an excuse for our wrongdoing, then reconciliation with God would 
not be necessary; what would instead be necessary is an understanding 
between God and us that we are not responsible for our wrong actions.
Further, this view of divine forgiveness distinguishes forgiveness from 
other ways of ceasing to blame the agent, such as ignoring the offense or 
merely moving on from it. When God is open to reconciliation with us 
with respect to our offenses, he does not ignore those offenses or merely 
move on from them. Rather, he is open to engaging with us with respect 
to those offenses so that our relationship with Him can be restored with 
respect to them.
Turn now to one-sided forgiveness. Just as in the case of human for-
giveness, the view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation 
with the wrongdoer allows one-sided forgiveness. This is because divine 
forgiveness, on this view, does not require reconciliation but only open-
ness to it. Hence, even if we are unrepentant, God can play his part in 
26I assume here that the relevant epistemic conditions are met. See n. 11 above.
27As Glen Pettigrove points out, we take consolation in the idea of God’s forgiving us 
because we take it to mean that we can have an intimate relationship with Him again (“The 
Dilemma of Divine Forgiveness,” 459).
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reconciling with us, having those attitudes and intentions towards us that 
would reconcile us to Him, if we were to have the right attitudes and in-
tentions for reconciliation with Him. As discussed above, it is a separate 
question whether God can or does forgive one-sidedly. The important 
point is that this view of divine forgiveness does not itself rule out the 
possibility. (In Section III.4 below, I consider the question of whether God 
does forgive us one-sidedly.)
Further, this view of divine forgiveness allows divine one-sided for-
giveness to be virtuous. There is nothing in the idea of God’s being open 
to reconciliation with us that rules out its being virtuous. As discussed 
above, being open to reconciliation with a wrongdoer does not require 
acting as if the offense did not happen or as if the wrongdoer acted cor-
rectly or was not responsible for the offense. It does not require having 
attitudes and intentions that are inappropriate given the attitudes and 
intentions of an unrepentant wrongdoer. Hence God can forgive us one-
sidedly while acknowledging that our relationship with Him is not on 
good terms until our attitudes and intentions toward Him and toward our 
wrongdoing are what they should be. This is the right result. It leaves open 
the possibility that God can display virtue in one-sided forgiveness, just 
as Louis Zamperini displayed virtue in one-sidedly forgiving his prison 
guards and just as the father displays virtue in one-sidedly forgiving the 
prodigal son.
So far, I have shown that the view that divine forgiveness is open-
ness to reconciliation meets the desiderata that any view of forgiveness 
should meet. Turn now to the desideratum for a view of Christian divine 
forgiveness: it should account for the close connection between divine 
forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Jesus expressed this connection at the 
Last Supper, when he said of the cup of wine: “for this is my blood of 
the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” 
(Matthew 26:28 NRSV).
The view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation meets 
this desideratum. To see this, first notice that Scripture and Christian tra-
dition claim that Christ’s atonement reconciles us to God. For example, 
Romans 5:10 says: “[f]or if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to 
God through the death of his Son, much more surely, having been recon-
ciled, will we be saved by his life” (NRSV). And Colossians 1:21–22 says: 
“[O]nce you were alienated from God and were enemies in your minds 
because of your evil behavior. But now he has reconciled you by Christ’s 
physical body through death to present you holy in his sight” (NRSV). 
Because Christ’s atonement reconciles us to God, it is reasonable to think 
that the atonement is crucial, perhaps even essential, for God’s being open 
to reconciliation with us. After all, if we accepted that Christ’s atonement 
reconciled us to God only because it was crucial for our being open to 
reconciliation with God, then we would be denying the close connection 
between the atonement and God’s forgiving us in the first place, since 
God cannot be open to reconciliation with us without forgiving us, no 
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matter how we understand divine forgiveness.28 Hence, if we understand 
God’s forgiving us in terms of His being open to reconciliation with us, 
as I claim, then Christ’s atonement is crucial, perhaps essential, for God’s 
forgiving us.29
Of course, the view that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to recon-
ciliation with us just shifts the explanatory burden from understanding 
why Christ’s atonement is important for divine forgiveness to under-
standing why it is important for reconciling us with God. Yet it is not a 
problem to shift this burden. The view that divine forgiveness is God’s 
openness to reconciliation with us still explains the close connection be-
tween Christ’s atonement and God’s forgiveness, given that the atonement 
reconciles us to God, as Scripture and Christian tradition say. Further, the 
view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation should not say 
more than this, as it should remain neutral amongst the various accounts 
of how and why the atonement reconciles us to God.
The explanatory power of this view of divine forgiveness with respect 
to the atonement is particularly evident when we consider again the 
prominent view that forgiveness is foreswearing resentment. The idea 
that divine forgiveness is foreswearing resentment toward us is too weak 
to explain the connection between divine forgiveness and the atonement. 
After all, even if we accepted the controversial claim that God can feel re-
sentment, it does not seem that He would need Christ to atone for our sins 
in order to foreswear it. Reconciliation, on the other hand, is conceptually 
linked to atonement, and so the view that divine forgiveness is openness 
to reconciliation with us is not too weak to explain why there is an impor-
tant connection between forgiveness and the atonement.
I have just argued that the view that divine forgiveness is God’s open-
ness to reconciliation with us meets the desiderata set out in Section I. I 
will next address an objection and then turn to the question of whether 
God forgives us one-sidedly.
28That is to say, God cannot be open to reconciliation with us with respect to our wrongdoing 
without forgiving us for that wrongdoing. See n. 18 above.
29Anthony Bash says that “the writers of the Christian Scriptures do not obviously link 
forgiveness and reconciliation,” even though both are facets of the atonement (Forgiveness, 
62). You might worry that this counts against the idea that divine forgiveness is openness 
to reconciliation, but it does not. To start, as Bash points out, reconciliation in Scripture is 
often discussed in collective contexts, whereas forgiveness is often discussed in interpersonal 
contexts (61). Yet clearly reconciliation takes place in interpersonal contexts, and forgiveness 
is crucially connected to that, as even Bash acknowledges when he says that forgiveness is 
about restoring relationships (38). Further, as Bash points out, Paul seems to link forgive-
ness and reconciliation through the idea of justification: in Romans 5:6–11, Paul connects 
justification and reconciliation (59), and in Romans 4:6–8, Paul links justification to divine 
forgiveness (131). Bash does not call this an obvious link between forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion, it seems, because of misplaced philosophical concerns about a) the relationship between 
forgiveness and reconciliation, which I address above in footnote 18, and b) the relationship 
between divine forgiveness and justice, which I discuss in Section III.4. Finally, it would often 
be redundant to explicitly connect forgiveness and reconciliation. After all, where reconcili-
ation is discussed, forgiveness would then be presupposed. 
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III.3. An Objection
Consider the following objection: if God requires Christ’s atonement in 
order to reconcile with us, then doesn’t placing that condition on reconcili-
ation with us entail that He is not open to reconciliation with us and so 
does not forgive us on the view that I am advocating?30 After all, for God to 
be open to reconciliation, I claimed that He must do His part in the recon-
ciliation so that reconciliation with Him just depends upon our attitudes 
and intentions. So if God imposes a further condition on reconciliation, 
it seems analogous to the above example, where you respond to your re-
pentant friend: “I am open to reconciling with you. But first I want you 
to let me borrow your car for the weekend.” As I said in discussing that 
example, when you say this, you are not open to reconciliation with your 
friend in the requisite sense, but rather will be open to reconciliation with 
your friend if she meets that condition. Thus, on the view that forgiveness 
is openness to reconciliation, you have not forgiven your repentant friend. 
Similarly, by imposing the condition of the atonement, it may appear that 
God fails to forgive us on the view that divine forgiveness is openness to 
reconciliation with us.
In response, note this about the friend example: if you indeed stipulate 
that you will reconcile with your friend if she allows you to borrow her 
car for the weekend and if she complies, then the condition that you set 
for being open to reconciliation with her is met. Given that (and assuming 
that you were correct in your assessment of how your attitudes and in-
tentions toward your friend would change after borrowing her car), you 
are then open to reconciliation with her in the requisite sense. Thus, on 
the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation, once your friend 
meets that condition, you forgive her. Similarly, given that God requires 
the atonement for reconciliation with us and given that condition has been 
met (and assuming any other conditions, if they exist, have also been met), 
He is open to reconciliation with us and so forgives us on the view that I 
advocate.
Of course, it is an important question whether it is morally bad to 
impose conditions on being open to reconciliation. We would certainly 
think better of you if you were open to reconciliation with your friend 
without first having her meet the condition of lending you her car for the 
weekend. Might it be morally better for God to be open to reconciliation 
with us without first requiring any conditions, including the atonement, 
to be met?
Although I cannot do justice to this question here, notice three things. 
First, because Christians accept that Jesus is God, God Himself actually 
meets the atonement condition; it is not a condition that we must meet. 
A morally significant difference therefore exists between God’s requiring 
the atonement and your imposing a condition on your friend. Hence we 
cannot conclude from the friendship example and examples like it that it 
30I thank Paul Draper for raising this objection.
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would be morally better for God not to impose any conditions on being 
open to reconciliation with us. Second, the atonement is central to the 
Christian understanding of how we are reconciled to God, and so it does 
not seem to be a gratuitous condition to impose, unlike the condition of 
having your friend lend you her car.
Third, because the atonement is central to our reconciliation with God, 
it is reasonable to think that good arguments can be given for the idea that 
it is morally better for God to require the atonement than not to impose 
any conditions on being open to reconciliation with us. I give such an argu-
ment elsewhere.31 There I appeal to the expressive function of punishment 
to argue that God, in his position of authority over us, must express the 
appropriate level of condemnation of our sin through punishment; other-
wise, He fails to disavow our sin and uphold the status of His laws, thereby 
undermining His moral goodness and authority, respectively. The atone-
ment allows God to fulfill the expressive function of punishment without 
our suffering the punishment for sin that we deserve but cannot bear—
namely, spiritual death. Hence, due to the atonement, God can express the 
appropriate level of condemnation of our sin, thereby upholding His moral 
goodness and authority, while also keeping open the possibility of recon-
ciling with us. If this is right, then it is morally better for God to have the 
atonement as a condition on being open to reconciliation with us. Although 
I cannot defend that argument here, arguments like it can be given for the 
idea that it is morally better for God to require the atonement to be open to 
reconciliation with us than not to impose any conditions at all.
We could also take another tack in responding to this objection. Rather 
than thinking of the atonement as a condition that must first be met in 
order for God to be open to reconciliation with us, we might instead think 
of the atonement as a penance that we must offer in order for reconcilia-
tion to take place between God and us. This could happen in either of two 
ways. First, following Richard Swinburne, we could say that God forgives 
us once we repent and apologize, since we have Christ’s atonement to 
offer to God as a reparation and penance for our sin.32 On the view that 
divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, this means 
that God becomes open to reconciliation with us once we repent and 
apologize, since Christ’s atonement serves as our reparation and penance. 
On this route, we maintain the idea that Christ’s atonement is essential for 
God’s forgiveness.
Second, on the view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation, a 
person can forgive while requiring penance, if that penance is necessary 
for the wrongdoer to have the attitudes and intentions required for recon-
ciliation.33 In such cases, in requiring penance, the victim just insists that 
31Strabbing, “The Permissibility of the Atonement as Penal Substitution.”
32Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, 161.
33I thank Mark Johnston and Sherif Girgis for bringing this point to my attention and Kyla 
Ebels-Duggan for helpful discussion about it. 
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the wrongdoer do his part in the reconciliation, which is consistent with 
the victim doing her part. To illustrate, you could be open to reconciliation 
with your repentant friend while requiring penance from her if otherwise 
she would feel too much in your debt to return to a friendship of equals. 
Or, you could be open to reconciliation with a wrongdoer who is not suf-
ficiently repentant while requiring penance, if that were necessary for the 
wrongdoer to realize the seriousness of her wrong. Similarly, then, it may 
be that God is open to reconciliation with us—and so forgives us, on the 
view advocated here—while requiring us to offer the atonement as our 
penance, if that were necessary for us to do our part in the reconcilia-
tion. For example, maybe our offering that penance is necessary for us to 
feel free of guilt and self-condemnation. Or maybe we can only properly 
realize the seriousness of our sin in offering Christ’s atonement to God 
as our penance. On this route, unless Christ’s atonement plays an inde-
pendent role in bringing about God’s forgiveness, God’s forgiveness does 
not depend upon the atonement after all, although our reconciliation with 
God still does. Of course, the atonement could still express God’s forgive-
ness on this route.34
Contrary to the above objection, then, God forgives us even though He 
requires the atonement. This is because the atonement either is a condition 
on God’s forgiveness that has already been met or a penance that we must 
offer. The atonement could also be both, as these options are not mutually 
exclusive.
III.4. Divine One-Sided Forgiveness
I turn now to the question of whether God forgives one-sidedly on the 
view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with us. The 
answer depends upon what conditions God places on being open to 
reconciliation with us. If God requires our repentance to be open to recon-
ciliation with us, then He does not forgive us one-sidedly. If He does not 
require our repentance to be open to reconciliation with us, then He may 
forgive one-sidedly. To determine whether and when He does, we must 
determine the conditions under which He is open to reconciliation with us 
to see whether and when those conditions are met. For example, suppose 
that the atonement is the only condition on God’s being open to reconcili-
ation with us. In that case, God forgives us all one-sidedly. After all, the 
atonement is accomplished and does not depend upon our repentance, 
and even those who repent are forgiven one-sidedly, since God would 
already be open to reconciliation with them. (This does not imply that 
God would be open to reconciliation with a wrongdoer with respect to a 
34If this route is correct, it could explain Anthony Bash’s claim, discussed in n. 29, that the 
Scripture writers do not obviously connect forgiveness and reconciliation, even though both 
are aspects of the atonement. Forgiveness could be an aspect of the atonement by expressing 
God’s forgiveness, and reconciliation could be an aspect by the atonement’s playing a crucial 
role in our being open to reconciliation with God. Note that this is consistent with divine 
forgiveness as openness to reconciliation.
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particular wrong before the wrong is committed. God could just be open 
to reconciliation with the wrongdoer as soon as the wrong is committed.)
It is an advantage of this view of divine forgiveness that it leaves open 
whether God forgives one-sidedly and, if He does, under what condi-
tions. As discussed above, whether God forgives one-sidedly should not 
be settled by a view of what divine forgiveness is. Instead, determining 
the conditions under which God forgives is a complicated theological 
issue, and this view of divine forgiveness rightly allows theology as well 
as philosophy to do work here. For example, in Matthew 6:15, Jesus says, 
“but if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your 
trespasses” (NRSV). Here Jesus appears to say that forgiving others is a 
condition on God’s forgiving us. Yet, on the other hand, Colossians 3:13 
says: “Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against an-
other, forgive each other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also 
must forgive” (NRSV). This verse appears to say that our forgiving others 
is not a condition on God’s forgiving us but is rather an obligation that 
emerges from the fact that God has forgiven us (at least those who have 
already repented). I will not attempt to resolve this issue. The point is that 
we need both theological and philosophical reflection to determine the 
conditions under which God forgives us, and the view that divine forgive-
ness is openness to reconciliation makes room for this reflection.
Importantly, this view of divine forgiveness also provides guidance for 
such reflection, since it says that the conditions that must be met for God to 
forgive us just are the conditions that must be met for God to be open to rec-
onciliation with us. This can be helpful. For example, someone who denies 
that everyone receives salvation might reason as follows: our repentance 
must be a condition on God’s forgiveness because otherwise everyone 
would receive salvation. My view says that this reasoning is flawed. Salva-
tion plausibly requires reconciliation with God, but God’s being open to 
reconciliation with us does not entail that we are all reconciled with Him. 
For reconciliation with God to happen, we must do our part: we must 
repent. (But that is not to say that we can do our part on our own. It may be 
that our repentance can only happen because of God’s work in us.) Hence, 
on the view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation, God’s 
forgiving us one-sidedly does not entail that we are reconciled with God 
and so does not entail that everyone receives salvation.
I have just shown that divine forgiveness as openness to reconciliation 
is consistent with God’s either forgiving us one-sidedly or not forgiving 
us one-sidedly, depending upon whether our repentance is a condition 
on His being open to reconciliation with us. Yet I believe that this view is 
particularly well-suited to the idea that God forgives us one-sidedly. This 
is because it is reasonable to think that, due to Christ’s atonement, God has 
done His part in reconciling with us, so that all that remains is for us to do 
our part in reconciling with Him by repenting. In other words, it is rea-
sonable to think that, due to the atonement, God has those attitudes and 
intentions toward us that would reconcile us to Him, if we repent so that 
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we have the attitudes and intentions required for reconciliation with Him. 
By accepting this, we take a strong understanding of the atonement, on 
which the atonement itself brings about God’s readiness to reconcile with 
us. This seems more plausible to me than accepting that the atonement 
functions just to make it the case that He will be open to reconciling with us 
if we just repent. After all, reconciliation requires our repentance anyway, 
and so there seems to be no gain in God’s requiring repentance just to be 
open to reconciliation with us once the atonement is accomplished. Fur-
ther, the idea that God forgives us one-sidedly fits well with the parable 
of the prodigal son. As mentioned above, I take this parable to illustrate 
divine forgiveness, and the father in the parable seems to forgive his son 
one-sidedly, running to his son and embracing him before he even speaks.
A significant advantage of accepting that God forgives us one-sidedly 
is that it allows God to display the beauty and virtue of one-sided forgive-
ness. The one-sided forgiveness that Louis Zamperini bestowed on his 
cruel prison guards is beautiful and virtuous, and we would expect God 
to display such beauty and virtue in His forgiveness too. In fact, we may 
find Zamperini’s forgiveness so beautiful and virtuous because it points to 
the beauty and virtue of God’s perfect forgiveness. Of course, there could 
be reasons why God should not or cannot forgive one-sidedly that do not 
apply in Louis Zamperini’s case. But if we accept that God forgives us 
one-sidedly and is virtuous in doing so, it makes the most powerful and 
beautiful cases of human forgiveness like God’s forgiveness, and I take 
that to be a significant benefit.
You could object to the idea that God forgives us one-sidedly as fol-
lows: it seems that we should ask God for forgiveness, but it does not 
make sense to do so if He has already forgiven us.35 In response, first keep 
in mind that this is not an objection to the view that divine forgiveness is 
openness to reconciliation but rather to my idea that God only requires the 
atonement, and not our repentance, as a condition on forgiving us. Next, 
I admit that it sounds odd to ask for forgiveness that has already been 
bestowed. But remember that asking for forgiveness plays a particular 
role: it expresses repentance. Thus, when we ask God to forgive our sins, 
we express repentance for those sins, and our repentance is necessary for 
reconciliation with God. So we could think of asking for God’s forgive-
ness as a way of expressing repentance so that reconciliation with God 
can ensue. We could equally say, “I repent of my sins.” Finally, if God 
forgives one-sidedly, even those who fail to repent are forgiven, but they 
have not appropriated that forgiveness. We could then think of asking 
for forgiveness as asking to take on or appropriate that status of being 
forgiven, which makes sense even if we are already forgiven.
Consider one final objection: if God forgives us one-sidedly, He either 
overlooks sin rather than taking sin seriously,36 or He acts unjustly because 
35I thank Brandon Warmke for this objection.
36Richard Swinburne raises this objection (Responsibility and Atonement, 153).
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forgiving an unrepentant wrongdoer lets the wrongdoer get away with 
the wrongdoing.37 The view that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation 
avoids this objection. Reconciliation with God still requires the wrong-
doer’s repentance, and as I have pointed out, being open to reconciliation 
with the wrongdoer does not require having attitudes toward him that 
are inappropriate given his lack of repentance. Hence, on the reasonable 
assumption that God does not have inappropriate attitudes toward unre-
pentant wrongdoers and does not act like their relationship with Him is 
restored, divine one-sided forgiveness still takes sin seriously and does 
not let the wrongdoer get away with wrongdoing. It is therefore not un-
just.
III.5. Can God Forgive Us?
I have argued that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation 
with us, the wrongdoers. This is a conceptual argument, telling us what 
divine forgiveness is. It is a separate question whether God can and does 
forgive us. It may be that God cannot forgive us because forgiving us is 
somehow incompatible with His nature. By determining what divine for-
giveness is, we gain the resources to approach the question of whether 
God can forgive. In fact, we can think of the argument in this paper as 
establishing a premise about the nature of divine forgiveness that can be 
used in an argument for either the conclusion that God forgives us or for 
the conclusion that God cannot or does not forgive us.
Although I think that God’s nature is compatible with His forgiving us, 
there are arguments to the contrary. For example, Anne C. Minas argues 
that the divine nature makes divine forgiveness impossible.38 She makes 
this argument using a few different understandings of forgiveness, but 
not the one that I have put forward. The closest that she comes to that 
account is in her discussion of forgiveness as relinquishing resentment. 
As she points out, to resent an offender, the injured party must take the 
offense personally, and taking an offense personally causes a breach in 
the relationship which forgiveness can heal. She then claims that God 
cannot take an offense personally because taking an offense personally is 
a human imperfection.
Even on the view that forgiveness is relinquishing resentment, I do not 
think that Minas’s response works. Contrary to Minas, I doubt that taking 
an offense personally is automatically a human imperfection. Taking an 
offense personally, as expressed in resentment, is often a perfectly appro-
priate response that upholds the dignity of the victim, claiming that she 
does not deserve to be treated in that way. Yet even if such a response 
shows that God cannot forgive us if forgiveness were relinquishing resent-
ment, it does not show that God cannot forgive us on the view that divine 
forgiveness is openness to reconciliation. This is because sin prevents us 
37Anthony Bash raises this worry (Forgiveness, 127–129).
38Minas, “God and Forgiveness.” 
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from having an intimate relationship with God even if He does not take 
our offenses personally, since we can assume that He cannot or will not 
have an intimate relationship with those who have attitudes and inten-
tions that result in wrongdoing. After all, such wrongdoing and attitudes 
are contrary to the basic standards of the intimate relationship that we 
should have with God, which include our keeping His commands and 
desiring to keep His commands.39 The upshot is that, if this view of divine 
forgiveness is correct, Minas has not shown that it is impossible for God to 
forgive. A different argument would be needed, showing how being open 
to reconciliation with us is incompatible with the divine nature.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconcilia-
tion with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. As I have 
shown, this view of divine forgiveness fits well with the parable of the 
prodigal son, which I take to illustrate divine forgiveness. It also meets 
the desiderata that a view of divine forgiveness should plausibly meet: it 
distinguishes forgiveness from excuse; it distinguishes forgiveness from 
other ways of ceasing to blame the agent, such as forgetting about the 
offense or just moving on from it; it permits God to forgive one-sidedly 
and allows that to be virtuous; it explains why divine forgiveness effects 
reconciliation between God and us when we repent; and it explains the 
close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement.
The main advantage of this view of divine forgiveness is that it accounts 
for the essential connection between God’s forgiveness and our reconcili-
ation with Him. When we repent, God’s forgiveness reconciles us to Him. 
If we extend other views of human forgiveness to divine forgiveness, such 
as forgiveness as relinquishing resentment or as releasing a wrongdoer 
from debt or punishment, such views fail to account for the power of 
God’s forgiveness to reconcile us to Him when we repent.
Finally, I discussed the question of whether God forgives us one-sidedly. 
Although the view that divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation 
with us is consistent with either option, I claimed that it is particularly 
well-suited to the idea that God forgives us one-sidedly, since it is reason-
able to think that, through the atonement, God has played His part in 
reconciling with us, such that all that remains is for us to play our part by 
repenting. If this is right, then the beauty and virtue of human one-sided 
forgiveness, such as that displayed by Louis Zamperini, is a reflection of 
divine forgiveness.40
Fordham University
39John Hare makes a similar point, saying that offenses against others are offenses against 
God that block our relationship with God, since they offend against the basic standards of 
our relationship with Him, which include our keeping His law (The Moral Gap, 225).
40I thank Lara Buchak and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. I also thank participants of the following workshops and conferences 
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